**Third Crusade**

3rd Crusade (1187-92) – in many ways the quintessential “crusade”, a crusade of Kings & great lords (“magnates”), featuring many often romanticised figures – most notably Richard “The Lion Heart” of England, and Saladin (Yusuf Ibn Ayyub, or Salah ad-Din, nephew of Nur ad-Din), a Kurdish general, who, aged 31, succeeded his uncle as Ayyubid (Kurdish dynasty) Sunni ruler of Egypt; later “Sultan” of Egypt & Syria. {btw, Saladin’s full name (in effect, his lineage) was *Al-Malik Al-Nasir Salah al-Dunya wa’l-Did Abu’l Muzzafar Ibn Ayyub Ibn Shadi al-Kurdy* – which, unsurprisingly, he used infrequently!}

Richard I of England: a great warrior/ general, but arguably a poor King of England (only one part of his huge “Angevin” realm) who left behind a “domestic” mess in England (in which he spent a total of 7 months during a 10 yr “reign”!) for his much maligned younger bro, John, to clear up.

Saladin: also a “great man” - like Richard, a first-rate general. Contrary to popular belief, Saladin & Richard never met face-to-face, although they did communicate with each other via envoys/ letters. Each respected the other, and in certain ways (iron-willed religiosity, warrior ethos, leadership, war fighting capability, sense of honour, ruthlessness) they *were* very similar, but Saladin was probably the more capable “politician”. ( See Muslim sources: Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, & Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani or ‘Muhammad ibn Hamed Isfahani’ on Saladin)

The rise of Saladin, & his promotion of “Jihad” (culminating in the Muslim recapture of Jerusalem, 1187), forms the background to “The Third Crusade”. Saladin’s rise came in the wake of his uncle, Nur ad-Din, a talented pragmatist who throughout 1149-1174 built Muslim unity in the Nr East, promoted “lesser Jihad”(Holy War in defence of Islam), and brought increasing pressure to bear on the Franks of “Outremer”.

**Rise of Nur ad- Din: crafty strategist, capable war leader, cunning/ pragmatic politician**

* Nur ad-Din’s father, *Zengi* of Mosul & Aleppo, murdered 14th Sept 1146: 2 sons – Saif ad-Din, & the younger (28) *Nur ad-Din* moved quickly (rather too smoothly?) to secure things. Officially, it was a disaffected Frankish slave (a trusted favourite of Z’s) who’d knifed their father, but this did not seem entirely credible to some.
* Saif took over Mosul; Nur ad-Din became Emir of Aleppo, which kick-started his remarkable rise to prominence.
* Thro’ the following yrs Nur ad-Din moved to secure his relatively precarious position. He was a “star performer” against the 2nd Crusade, & thereafter moved to shore up his position in N Syria.
* In the process he unified Syria, moved forces into Egypt, and inflicted some significant defeats on the Franks of Outremer.
* Initially, to secure Aleppo, it was vital to neutralise the Frankish outposts of Apamea & Harim, which controlled the East bank of the River Orontes. Strategically, control of these centres wld enable Nur ad-Din to block any moves from Antioch against Aleppo.
* Summer 1149 - Nur ad-Din moved: initially, against Apamea by investing the fort at Inab which protected the strategically vital Ash-Shogur bridge over R Orontes. Raymond of Antioch tried to counter this – 29th June ambushed by Nur ad-Din’s cavalry – hard fight (Battle of Inab): Frankish force destroyed – Raymond KIA – his head & arms sent to Caliph in Baghdad.
* Mid – late July, 1189: Nur ad-Din took Harim & Apamea - total control of all territory East of Orontes. Nur ad-Din now far more secure in Aleppo, but did not overreach himself by moving against the formidable fortifications of Antioch – too risky at this stage. Excellent military judgement. He did, however, “send a message” to the Franks, demonstrating his strategic “reach” by swimming in the Mediterranean!

During this period (1149-54) the Crusader States of Outremer were quite weak/ vulnerable:

1. Baldwin III, K of Jerus, only 19, had ruled jointly with his mother Melisende since 1143. At constant loggerheads – Melisende wldn’t concede power to her son/ by early 1150s B trying to make her abdicate.
2. Death of Raymond at Battle of Inab, 1149 forced Baldwin to assume control of Antioch - Ray’s heir only 5, and his widow, Constance, wldn’t marry a “suitable” man of Baldwin’s choosing. Baldwin, therefore, had to run Antioch himself.
3. 1152 – Raymond II Count of Tripoli killed by “Assassins” resulting in Baldwin having to step in there too. Thus Baldwin (still only in his 20s) ended up ruling all 3 surviving crusader states – he was an able fellow, but now severely overstretched.
4. Fiasco of 2nd Crusade meant that Europeans were v reluctant to commit forces to protection of Frankish Outremer, which was increasingly isolated/ facing growing Muslim power in Nr East.

**Nur ad-Din contd to consolidate his power in N Syria (1154-63)**

* Focused energy/ resources on taking Damascus – a carefully applied mixture of military threat, propaganda, and diplomacy resulted in him so doing by April 1154. Aleppo, Damascus, and the whole of Muslim Syria were now under his control: formidable power base to launch “Jihad” V Franks.
* Despite what some Muslim sources allege, Nur ad-Din did not launch a “Holy War” immediately. In fact, he played a strategic “long game”, and often engaged diplomatically with the Franks whilst further consolidating his Syrian power base, and enabling “Jihad” to build. He was an extremely clever strategist who was not going to risk all by impetuosity.
* Careful fostering of himself as devout Muslim ldr: imams, jurists, and Sufi mystics embedded within his army – unification of “Book & Sword”. Massive public building schemes (many financed personally by him): mosques/ minarets/ madrasas/ hospitals/ orphanages/ Sufi cloisters constructed thro’out urban centres of Syria. Most famous example – “House of Justice”, Damascus, where Nur ad-Din himself often sat as a judge.
* Without doubt, much of this was clever politics designed to present Nur ad-Din as a just, caring, Sunni Muslim ruler. However, serious illness (1157-8) had a profound effect; he seems to have undergone a very real personal spiritual experience. Increasingly his focus became personal “Greater Jihad” as a precursor of “Lesser Jihad” (Holy War) V the Franks. He rejected personal luxuries, discarding all rich clothing and wearing only the plain attire of the Sufi mystics. 1161 – undertook Hajj to Makkah (Mecca), after which he had the walls of Medina (2nd city in Islam) rebuilt, and explicitly encouraged religious ldrs to promote religious martyrdom. There was specific focus on the duty of all Muslims to retake Islam’s 3rd most holy city – al-Quds, or Jerusalem.

**1154-63: Crusader States recovered their “mojo”**

* Nur ad-Din was well established in Syria, but not really able to make serious advances V Franks, because…
* Baldwin III took Southern port of Ascalon (8 mnth siege), 1153, which secured his S frontier; provided a launch pad for a possible Frankish attack on Egypt, & made trade & Christian pilgrim routes much more secure. Franks now held all Palestinian ports.
* Antioch revived in the N:Constance married Reynald of Chatillon, 1153 – R was a ruthless French knight who’d impressed Baldwin at Siege of Ascalon, and gained the young king’s confidence. Reynald proved a brutal defender of Outremer (prob, like Zengi, a psychopath!), but v effective – until captured by Nur ad-Din, 1161.
* 1158 Franks retook Harim: Antioch now a threat to Nur ad-Din.
* Improving relations b/ween Franks & Byzantines: Manuel I seemed keen to end the ill feeling resulting from 2nd Crusade – maybe worried about Syrian situ? Sept 1158 – Manuel’s niece, Theodora, married Baldwin III. 1161 – Manuel himself married Maria of Antioch, daughter of Constance & Raymond of Antioch. These marriage alliances grtly strengthened Outremer.
* 1159 – Manuel I started assembling Christian forces in Antioch to take Aleppo!
* Nur ad-Din – always the patient pragmatist – recognised this threat as potentially overwhelming, and made a truce with Byzantines.
* Reynald of Chatillon captured, 1161: again, Nur ad-Din played the “long game” – cld have sought to exploit this weakening of Antioch, but instead did a deal with Baldwin III; another truce. (Reynald eventually released unharmed, 1176)
* Baldwin III died unexpectedly, 1163 (33 - tuberculosis) – Nur ad-Din did not exploit this either. Sent condolences – watched – waited. He still was not ready to launch “Jihad”. Why not?

**The problem with Egypt**

* Needed to unify Islamic forces for effective Jihad – split b/ween his Sunni regime in Syria, and the weak/ chaotic Shi’ah Fatimid rule in Egypt undermined this.
* Control of Egypt wld confer huge strategic benefits: first, he’d be able to encircle Outremer. Second, Egypt’s wealth and massive food reserves wld facilitate sustained military campaigns.
* 1163-74: Nur ad-Din & his commanders focused on getting control of Egypt
* Sept 1163 – Almaric, K of Jerus (yngr bro of Baldwin III who’d succeeded his childless sibling, 1163) made first of 5 attempts to take Egypt (defeated when Egyptians flooded area around Bilbais, a town he’d besieged).
* Nur ad-Din compelled to respond – Frankish control of Egypt wld be catastrophic…
* April 1164 – Kurdish General Shirkuh (obese, blind in one eye, but v capable/ respected/ trusted) ordered in to Egypt (2i/c was his nephew, Saladin): Shirkuh was a loyal member of Nur ad-Din’s inner circle, but also saw this as a great opportunity for his clan, the Ayyubids.
* 1164-69 – hard Egyptian campaign to keep Franks out of Nile region, but also build an Ayyubid base in Egypt.
* Winter 1168/9 – turning point – Amalric’s 4th Egyptian expedition defeated – Jan ’69 Egyptian Vizier (chief minister of the Caliph) assassinated – Shirkuh new Egyptian ruler. Syria & Egypt now under Sunni control – threat to Jerusalem massive.
* March 1169 – Shirkuh died (heart attack) – Saladin took over as Vizier, and consolidated his hold over Egypt: imposed Sunni Islam/ put family members in key govt positions (eg father became treasurer)/ Shi’ah judges, officials, imams sacked/ Sunni madrasas estab’d/ teenage Fatimid Caliph (al-Adid) undermined. Saladin crushed the formidable Fatimid Sudanese Infantry Corps; replaced by his own elite personal troops, *The Salahiyya*.
* Autumn 1169 – Amalric’s 5th invasion defeated @Battle of Damietta.
* Franks now v fearful – Autunm 1170, sending pleas for help to Europe & Byzants. English & French kings at loggerheads, so even though Henry II of England was Amalric’s nephew, nothing was forthcoming. Amalric’s despair indicated by fact that in early 1171 he paid personal homage to Manuel I in Constantinople.
* Saladin meanwhile was getting stronger: Aug 1171, yng Caliph al-Adid taken “ill” (poison?), & Saladin took over: 10th Sept, launched a Sunni Coup d’Etat. Friday prayer – name of the Shi’ah Caliph, al-Adid, not mentioned/ replaced by that of the Sunni Caliph of Baghdad! Shocking enough, but the next day a vast military “parade” was held in Cairo signalling that the 20 yr old Shi’ah Caliph was no longer in charge, and 200 yrs of Shi’ah dominance was at an end. Saladin & the Sunni were the new power in Egypt; al-Adid died 13th Sept 1171.
* Late Sept 1171 – Saladin led his forces into Transjordan to link-up with Nur ad-Din and attack Kerak & Montreal castles. Forces never combined. Saladin withdrew to Egypt. Nur ad-Din now concerned Saladin had become a “loose cannon”; powerful, out of his control.
* Nur ad-Din threatening to invade Egypt/ bring Saladin to heel.
* Stand-off b/ween the 2 powerful Sunni warlords – relations did not improve – Saladin now a law unto himself – war seemed inevitable, by 1174 imminent:
* 15th May 1174 – Nur ad-Din had heart attack/ died.
* Saladin now in a difficult position – cld easily have been dragged into a Muslim civil war V Nur ad-Din loyalists (The Zengid dynasty/ regime) in Syria & Mesopotamia. It was at this time (1174-84) that he really demonstrated his qualities as a politician/ statesman.
* Saladin assured Nur ad-Din’s young heir, al-Salih, of his loyalty, and then married Nur ad-Din’s widow. Patient diplomacy, tact, reassurance, & protection of Nur ad-Din’s family, all increased Saladin’s credibility/ authority over Syria.
* Moved V Damascus on grounds its rulers had betrayed Muslims by making a truce with Jerusalem Franks. 28th Oct 1174 – took control with large show of military force, whilst also buying the support of common folk by large money gifts to them, and by end of 1174 most Syrian warlords had declared their loyalty to the new “Sultan”. It did, however, take until 1183 for Saladin to estab total control of Syria, incl Aleppo.

**During the same period (1174-85) the Crusader states were weakening:**

* Baldwin IV, King of Jerusalem, 1174-85: brave/ resolute, but suffering from leprosy, which eventually killed him. Baldwin increasingly crippled by the disease – early 20s partially paralysed, nrly blind, had to be strapped on a horse or carried in a litter.
* Growing factionalism as leading Franks manoeuvred to claim the succession - Baldwin had no heir & was bound to die young: Raymond III, Count of Tripoli (Baldwin’s cousin) V Baldwin’s mother, Agnes, & her supporters. 1180 – Baldwin’s sister, Sibylla, married French knight, Guy of Lusignan: a credible regent & eventual successor, which alienated Raymond. Much tension/ rivalry. This internal politicking distracted Franks from growing threat of Saladin, & when it was considered, there were different strategies advocated. Raymond, seeing himself as the natural heir/ experienced “old hand”, favoured diplomacy; Raynald of Chatillon (released from Muslim captivity, 1176) advocated, and practised, aggression, which antagonised Saladin, & eventually gave him a reason to launch all-out attack on Franks.
* Lack of support from Byzantines and Europe: new Byzant. Emperor Andronicus I (crowned 1180) had no interest; nor had any major European ruler – eg failed mission of 1184/5: Patriarch of Jerus (+ Masters of Hospitallers & Templars) got nothing from H II of England, nor from Phil II of Fra.
* 1177-83 Saladin probed defences of Crusader states…
* Autumn 1177: raided in strength – defeated by Baldwin IV & Reynald of Chatillon @ Battle of Montgisard, nr Jerus – Saladin retreated/ lucky to survive.
* Summer 1179: destroyed castle under construction @ Jacob’s Ford, an important crossing-point on R Jordan b/ween Frankish Palestine & Muslim Syria.
* Summer 1182: failed amphibious assault (using the revamped Egyptian navy) on Beirut.
* Oct 1183: major incursion into K of Jerus in response to Reynald’s attacks on Muslim pilgrims en route via Red Sea to Makkah (Mecca) – indecisive “encounter” @ Saffuriya – Saladin withdrew before meeting Guy of Lusignan’s main force, but he had tested Frankish responses quite severely.
* Nov 1183: laid siege to Kerak, Transjordan. (Famously, during this siege Saladin suspended bombardment for a night whilst Princess Isabella, Sibylla’s niece, consummated her marriage!) Kerak, however, resisted effectively – Saladin had to break the siege & withdraw his forces.
* May 1185: Baldwin IV died – succession crisis – Baldwin V, 7 yr old son of Sibylla, succeeded, but was v ill – died Sept 1186! Raymond III of Tripoli was regent, but when young Baldwin died, Sibylla & Guy of Lusignan outmanoeuvred him – crowned joint monarchs of Jerusalem. Raymond furious/ humiliated, & when he feared Guy was planning to move against him in Galilee, Raymond cut a deal with Saladin. Muslim pilgrims promised safe passage thro’ Raymond’s territory in exchange for Muslim backing of his claim to be rightful King of Jerusalem.
* Dec 1185-Spring 1186: serious, life threatening, illness compelled Saladin to review his situ/ longer-term plans. Now heavily/ personally committed to Jihad V Franks, and the divisions in the Crusader States were propitious. Once fully recovered, Saladin moved. Helped by Reynald of Chatillon’s on-going attacks on Muslim pilgrims, a clear breach of the recent treaty made with Raymond of Tripoli, and when that formally expired in April 1087, Saladin could legitimately start to “shape the battlespace” for a full-on invasion of Palestine.
* Late April/ early May: launched preparatory raids in strength over the border. 1st May 1187 – destroyed small Hospitaller/ Templar force @ Battle of Cresson. Withdrew having killed >100 Templars/ Hospitallers. Massive psychological shock to Franks.
* June 1187: forces mustering for a showdown. Raymond recognised severity of threat – expelled Muslims from his land/ declared support for Guy as K of Jerusalem. Franks mustered about 16,000 troops, incl 1,200 fully fledged knights, @ Saffuriya near the Old Roman Road to the port of Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee.
* Saladin’s forces, however, probably numbered at least 30,000 trained troops, incl plenty of cavalry/ mounted archers. Disciplined, well trained, highly motivated.
* 2nd June – Saladin attacked Tiberias. Raymond (whose wife was trapped in the now besieged citadel there) advised caution, but the inexperienced King Guy took Saladin’s bait and moved out of the security of Saffuriya (3rd July) to advance on Tiberias over an arid plateau where Saladin’s forces had already prepared a killing ground by filling in the wells. Heat exhaustion/ dehydration soon slowed the Frankish advance, and they were harried all the way by Saladin’s lightly armoured cavalry/ mounted archers. Nightmarish journey – one day march to Tiberias now impossible – Franks made camp on the waterless plateau.
* Dawn 4th July 1187 – Franks resumed their march. At midday, further weakened by lack of water/ blistering sun, came under attack again. Saladin’s forces set fire to scrub ahead of their line of march – Franks choked by pall of dense smoke, and then bombarded by volleys of arrows. Left road/ took refuge in extinct volcanic crater known as “The Horns of Hattin”.
* Guy rallied his forces around the relic of “The True Cross”. Made 2 desperately valiant attempts to counter-attack Saladin’s army, but to no avail. A great victory for Saladin, who reportedly wept in joy. King Guy & Reynald of Chatillon captured, as was “The True Cross”. Utter catastrophe for Franks – Jerusalem now practically defenceless.
* Saladin treated Guy honourably – “Kings do not kill kings”. Personally decapitated the dishonourable, arrogant, duplicitous Reynald of Chatillon.
* Saladin’s victorious army swept thro’ Outremer: late Sept invested Jerusalem, which yielded to Saladin’s honourable offer of “quarter” on 29th Sept 1187. 2nd Oct 1189 (anniversary of the Prophet’s “Night Journey” from al-Quds to Heaven), Saladin entered the “City of God” in triumph. The 90 year Frankish occupation was at an end: sent shock waves thro’ Christendom – aged Pope Urban III allegedly died of grief.
* Late Oct 1187 – new Pope Gregory VIII, issued a bull *Audita Tremendi* invoking a new crusade to Holy Land.

***The Third Crusade, 1187-92***

*Audita Tremendi* galvanised Christendom, esp because it lambasted the sins of Eastern Franks and W Europeans – demanded collective penitence – response massive, esp from the 3 greatest rulers of Christian Europe at the time:

1. Richard I, “Lion Heart” (in fact, a C14th sobriquet – not used in R’s time), heir to the “Angevin Empire” of Henry II, which incl’d England.
2. Philip II, King of France.
3. Frederick I, “Barbarossa”, Emperor of the Germans.

Leadership of 3 mighty rulers was both a blessing and a drawback. On one hand, each could muster substantial resources/ mil forces; on the other, they had huge responsibilities & many interests in Europe, which cld be a distraction, & 2 of them were rivals of sorts. Huge potential conflicts of interests/ disunity.

Richard I (1157-99), King of England, 1189-99.

* Eldest son Henry II of England & Eleanor of Aquitaine (former wife of Louis VII of Fra) – heir to the “Angevin Empire”.
* NB Like all “English Kings” of the time, Richard’s first language was French, & their French lands were at least as important to them as their English kingdom.
* The Norman/ Angevin inheritance meant they had some claims to the French throne, & they were very real threats to the still emerging French Monarchy.
* Richard was the great grandson of Fulk of Anjou, King of Jerusalem, 1131-42, so also had strong familial ties to Outremer.
* 1172 (15 yrs old) R became Duke of Aquitaine – basically SW France. Constant disputes with King of France, who was technically R’s liege lord.
* Aged 12 Rich had been “betrothed” to Alice, daughter of Philip II, but Henry II used this as polit leverage when dealing with Phil II – marriage never actually took place – lingering resentment/ uncertainty b/ween English & French kings.
* Richard himself disputed control of certain French territories with French king, but was also often at loggerheads with his father, Henry II. At times, Rich even sided with Philip II against his fa Henry II.
* Richard I led the way – first of the “Big 3” to take the Cross, Nov 1187, as ‘Duke of Aquitaine & Count of Poitu’. Surprising given his need to defend Aquitaine V Phil II, but he *was* very devout, & had strong familial connections with Jerusalem. He liked war – prob saw a chance to enhance his warrior reputation! Forced Henry II’s hand, who declared his own commitment, Jan 1188, alongside Philip II of France.
* His fa, Henry II, died July 1189: Rich inherited his huge empire, & was thus massively resourced. However, as the new Angevin King of England his suspicion of/ rivalry with Phil II of France was bound to intensify.
* He used England to resource his expedition: tax (“Saladin Tithe”), ruthlessly efficient utilisation of assets (eg sale of estates), naval build-up (speed of sea travel to Nr East/ grtr strategic & tactical flexibility once there/ excluded non-combatants – ltd space on ships), & imposition of strict discipline/ code of conduct on all who joined army. Richard’s force was disciplined & professional – well resourced – no “hangers-on”.

Philip II (1165-1223), King of France, 1179-1223

* Aged 24, when he took the Cross with Henry II of England (Jan 1188) Philip had already been on French throne for 8 yrs.
* He was reconciled with H II @ Gisors, nr Paris, after hearing an inspiring sermon by Archbishop Joscius of Tyre – allegedly, a miraculous cross appeared in the sky as he preached! Agreed to campaign together under the Cross (red for French/ white for English), but by March the 2 were at loggerheads again over disputed French territories.
* Richard’s accession to Engl throne altered little: Phil the more experienced ruler; technically Richard (his elder by 6 yrs) was his vassal in France (as D of Normandy; Count of Anjou; D of Aquitaine), but was now also a fellow monarch, and a much better resourced one - awkward.
* Richard’s army was much larger/ better equipped than Philip’s, but Philip was the cannier politician.
* Richard was v able, but primarily a war leader.
* Philip was more subtle/ politically astute/ cautious.
* Their fundamental differences – different personalities; diff resource levels; mutually conflicting interests in France meant there was a basic lack of trust from the outset, and this rivalry delayed their departure from Europe for a year because each wanted guarantees of security for their French interests.

Frederick I, “Barbarossa” (Red Beard), (1125-90), Emperor of the Germans, 1152-90.

* By far the mightiest ruler in “Christendom”.
* Well into his sixties, but vigorous & hugely experienced in politics & war. Had forced fractious German barons into unity under his leadership, and made peace with the Papacy after yrs of conflict in Italy.
* Vastly well resourced, and he’d been crusading before, as his uncle Conrad III’s deputy on 2nd Crusade, so understood well the hazards of such undertakings.
* Took the cross @ Mainz, March 1188. Prepared thoroughly: exiled domestic opponents/ estab’d his son as heir. Massive funding, but forced indiv nobles to finance their own levies – which underwrote their personal commitment, and ensured they had few spare resources to cause trouble via their own agents back in Ger whilst he was absent. Clever.
* Departed Germany, May 1189, at head of a huge army: well- equipped, trained, & disciplined.
* Formidable – Frederick poised to be the obvious C-in-C of the Crusade who’d command the respect of the rival French & English kings, “knock heads together” if necessary, provide experienced strategic oversight, & maintain unity of purpose.

The journey to the Holy land

* Altho’ R & P departed together from Vezelay, 4th July 1190, this apparent unity didn’t last.
* Agreed to separate forces @ Lyon – regroup @ Messina, Sicily.
* Agreed to share equally any proceeds of forthcoming expedition. But…
* Richard then started to go solo…
* Arr Messina (Sept, 1190) – a month after Philip’s force, as agreed, but…
* Richard then took over the port, and spent next 6 mnths consolidating his own interests in Sicily: raising cash/ garnering resources for his force, incl a marriage deal with Berengaria, daughter of K of Navarre, for 10,000 marks – a total breach of his long-standing “marriage contract” with Philip’s daughter, Alice, which the French King had little choice but to agree to!
* Richard’s fleet left Messina, 30th March 1191: storm diverted them to Cyprus; Greek Ruler, Isaac II, tried to take some of R’s family hostage – R invaded Cyprus. Later sold Cyprus to the Templars – kept the cash for himself/ nothing for Philip.
* Meanwhile, Frederick’s mighty army had moved overland from Regensburg (May 1189) via Hungary & Byzantine territory.
* By April 1190, experiencing diffs in Byzantine territory because they did not receive the logistical support, security, and guides the Emperor had promised.
* Once in Seljuk territory the Germans came under continual attack, but succeeded in taking Iconium (May 1190) and moved into Christian Armenia.
* 10th June 1190 – disaster – Frederick drowned during a river crossing in Cilician Armenia. Many Germans went home; remnants of Fred’s army proceeded to Acre.
* But - Key ldr was dead before Rich & Phil had even left France.

Situation in Holy land/ Siege of Acre

* Saladin struggled to build on his great victories – Muslim disunity again emerging – his military & political power was waning.
* 1187-8: attacked Tyre, but was driven back by effective defence organised by Conrad of Montferrat, a v able Italian noble recently arr in Holy land.
* Summer 1189: Saladin released Guy of Lusignan from captivity – a noble gesture/ maybe anticipated some political gain?
* Big mistake – Guy still, technically, Christian “King of Jerusalem” – rallied many to his cause, & laid siege to the crucial port of Acre.
* Siege of Acre – brutal stalemate – Guy’s force entrenched b/ween Acre & Saladin’s army.
* Reinforced by forces of Conrad of Montferrat, and then first waves of crusaders from Europe.
* May 1191 – Philip II of France arrived – estab his force to East of Acre.
* June 1191 – Richard I of England arrived – estab force to North of Acre.
* Not a good situ for Muslim garrison – no options, unless Saladin cld relieve them – increasingly unlikely.
* Both kings took sick – scurvy?
* Saladin tried to negotiate – even sent fruit, iced water etc.
* Siege contd – brutal, but English & French sappers, siege engines took their toll…
* 2nd July – walls & key towers crumbling under bombardment.
* 12th July defenders yielded in return for quarter/ Muslim lives spared etc.
* Muslim population evacuated; Richard & Philip triumphant, esp Richard who’d done much to galvanise the siege, & lead it to successful conclusion.
* Philip, however, was still unwell, and increasingly irritated by Richard’s arrogance, and personal betrayals.
* Politics reared its head: contested Kingship of Jerusalem (still, of course, in Muslim hands!): Richard favoured Guy of Lusignan, but Philip wanted Conrad of Montferrat to take over.
* Eventually agreed (late July) that Guy shld reign for life, but then be succeeded by Conrad of Montferrat.
* Phil remained disgruntled/ unwell – and was worried about his lands in Flanders because the Count of Flanders had died during the siege of Acre.
* Wanted to get home asap/ reassert control. After much discussion/ argument Richard & Philip agreed to respect/ safeguard each other’s French territories, which freed Phil to go home to France whilst Richard contd with the campaign in Nr East.
* R never, however, really trusted Phil’s guarantees, and his worries re his French lands distracted him thereafter…
* Philip abandoned the Crusade – headed back to Europe, early Aug, 1191.
* Meanwhile, Saladin was delaying meeting all recent terms agreed with Franks: prisoners not released; did not return “The True Cross”; no ransoms paid.
* Richard’s response was ruthless: 19th/ 20th Aug, 1191 – 2,700 Muslim prisoners slaughtered outside Acre.

**Richard’s advance on Jaffa, Aug 1191**

Rather than head straight for Jerusalem, R took decision to move South 80 miles to Jaffa. Why?

1. Jaffa = Jerusalem’s port – its capture wld isolate Jerus, & be a secure base from which to launch main assault on City of God.
2. From Jaffa R wld also be able readily to take Ascalon to the South, and interdict a critical Muslim supply line to Egypt – wld isolate Saladin. All of this was strategic good sense, highlighting R’s sound generalship.
3. Whilst capturing strategically important ports, and thereby strengthening his own position, Richard could also think/ plan carefully about how best exactly to take Jerusalem. Again, demo’d R’s high level of military competence. Crusaders wld be outnumbered – he understood importance of maintaining “entry ports”/ supply lines, maintaining “fallbacks” for worst case scenarios, “shaping the battlespace” etc. He was an excellent general, who saw the bigger picture, & thought things thro’/ planned & prepared thoroughly.

It wasn’t easy, however, to convince many to leave the comfort/ security of Acre, but eventually Richard mustered a force of 15,000 (incl Hospitallers & Templars), and by 25/26th Aug had imposed strict march discipline for the highly risky but bold move South via Caesarea & Arsuf to Jaffa:

* A very “tight”/ secure formation was imposed: Richard, Guy of Lusignan, & main army in centre.
* Templars formed the vanguard; Hospitallers guarded the rear.
* Hugged coast. Naval forces shadowed them offshore – maintained supplies etc.(crucial)
* Supply train protected b/ween coast/ fleet & body of main army.
* Infantry/ archers screened the landward Left Flank.
* Richard’s military competence was again evident here – v “professional”.
* March was v harsh; under constant attack by Muslim forces (described graphically, 6 yrs later, by chronicler Ambroise, who’d accompanied the army).
* Richard’s leadership/ imposition of v firm march discipline ensured that most survived despite severe threats/ challenges.
* As the Crusaders left the hilly Forest of Arsuf onto the plain approx. 25 miles N of Jaffa, Saladin made a decisive move (7th Sept): 30,000 Muslim troops blocked the route.
* A brutally chaotic “encounter battle” ensued – Muslim cavalry onslaughts/ Crusader counter-attacks – thro’out Richard maintained formation & kept up the forward momentum. Eventually, Saladin’s larger force was driven off.
* Battle of Arsuf was indecisive, but Saladin had failed to stop the Crusader advance on Jaffa, and his forces had taken heavy losses, and their morale dipped badly.
* Ambroise lauded Richard as a great hero/ war leader, and there’s little doubt that but for his planning, command & control, and decisive leadership, the Crusaders probably wld’ve been crushed by Saladin’s much bigger force.
* Asbridge argues that Richard was merely reacting as he had to in a fast changing, dynamic, tactical situation, but whatever the reality, it was Richard, more than any other ldr, who forced a passage thro’ to Jaffa, placing Saladin in a very precarious strategic situation.
* Once estb’d in Jaffa, however, the Crusaders lost impetus, which gave Saladin time to recover to some degree – he regained some initiative, regrouped his forces, and started to “shape the battlespace” to his advantage.
* A measure of Saladin’s desperation, however, was that he ordered immediate destruction of Ascalon’s defences to deny it as secure port to the Crusaders.
* Richard argued forcefully for an immediate advance on Ascalon – ruined or not, control of the area would enable the Crusaders to block Saladin’s supply lines to Egypt. Strategically this was sound reasoning, but others wanted to focus immediately on Jerusalem.
* Whilst the Crusaders faffed/ argued/ partied in Jaffa (many prostitutes from Acre had arrived to ply their trade!), Saladin set about neutralising all Frankish defensive outposts b/ween Jaffa & Jerusalem which had been left isolated/ vulnerable by the Crusade’s loss of the initiative.
* Richard’s frustration/ anger at this lack of drive was, therefore, entirely vindicated: he understood the strategic imperatives of war in a way most of the other leaders clearly did not.
* Arguably, this delay in Jaffa, & failure to take immediate control of the Ascalon region (which wld’ve denied Saladin supplies from Egypt), probably cost the 3rd Crusade the ultimate prize because it enabled Saladin to stay in the fight, regroup his forces, impose delays, play for time etc.
* 29th Oct, 1191: Crusaders left Jaffa, but faced constant delays en route to Jerusalem. Saladin’s forces harassed them continually (“hit & run” attacks), and they had to restore the forts (recently demolished by Saladin’s men) along the route as they went. Militarily necessary as “fall back” positions in case they encountered unexpectedly heavy Muslim resistance whilst moving thro’ enemy held territory.
* Saladin’s delaying strategy was enhanced by diplomacy: military pressure was interspersed with offers of deals. Richard, for example, got involved in talks with Saladin’s brother, al-Adil, even proposing his sister Joan as a wife for Al-Adil in exchange for partition of Palestine b/ween Muslims & Christians.
* Came to nothing in the end (not least due to Joan’s objections!), but this weird period of fighting & talking reflected the military realities: Saladin needed to buy time, & Richard was leading a force that was understrength for a sustained siege of Jerusalem.
* Each leader was probably also probing the other’s responses/ trying to get insights into how his opposite number thought/ reacted. There was certainly a great mutual respect, plus wariness.
* Onset of Winter also slowed Crusaders. Reached Beit Nuba (12 miles NW of Jerusalem) in late Dec 1191.
* Richard held conference with Franks of Outremer, & ldrs of Mil Orders. Big concern that supply lines to coast were vulnerable, and forces insufficient to take & hold Jerusalem.
* 13th Jan 1192: Richard ordered withdrawal to Ascalon to regroup/ rethink. Not great for morale, but militarily a v sound decision. Focused on rebuilding Ascalon’s defences.
* Had Richard’s forces been larger it might have been v different, but Philip’s departure, and the earlier death of Frederick, meant the Crusaders were now “down to their bones”, and simply lacked the strength to have a realistic chance of taking Jerusalem.

**Richard’s renewed attempt to take Jerusalem, June-July 1192**

Spring 1192 – Richard in tricky situation:

1. On-going rivalry b/ween Guy of Lusignan & Conrad of Montferrat – C challenged G.
2. Nobility favoured Conrad as a better long-term “bet” as K of Jerus.
3. April – R declared support for Conrad too. Possibly a brutal political calculation based on current military necessity, or… R was being very devious:
4. 28th April – Conrad murdered by “Assassins” in Tyre.
5. Many believed Richard was behind this – that he was, in fact, still loyal to Guy.
6. Truth will prob never be known. These events, however, highlighted the febrile/ paranoid atmosphere in the Crusader/ Frankish camp. Not good.
7. Meanwhile, Richard was informed that his yngr bro, John, had exiled his regent, William Longchamp, and was asserting personal rule in England.
8. 29th May – Richard told Philip of France was “in talks” with John!
9. Richard, uncharacteristically, dithered – seemed to lose focus/ drive. Depressed?
10. 31st May – nobility forced his hand by declaring their intent to advance immediately on Jerusalem.

Saladin’s reaction was immediate – mustered forces & hunkered down in Jerusalem, obviously having decided to “tough it out”, and hope that the Crusade wld not be able to sustain a long siege. Uncharacteristically passive strategy – why?

* Saladin’s health was not good, and his forces were denuded & exhausted after 6 years of war fighting.
* He was short of funds, and elements of his army (incl some of his own clan) were critical of his leadership.
* He probably, therefore, had ltd confidence in the ability of his forces to sustain aggressive military operations V Crusaders/ Franks, and he certainly could not finance such.
* He was well aware that the enemy had big problems too, so defending Jerusalem to the exclusion of all else made best sense strategically: he could prob “see them off”.

Nevertheless, Saladin’s situation was desperate. The Crusaders advanced rapidly – by 10th June were only 12 miles from Jerusalem @ Beit Nuba, attacking Muslim supply lines, and “psyching themselves up” for an assault on Jerusalem by such “discoveries” as yet another piece of “The True Cross”!? Did not augur well. Muslim sources describe Saladin’s tears of despair at prayer, and there were rumours he was planning to flee Jerusalem. Probably untrue, but indicative of a crisis of morale/ confidence in the Muslim camp. Saladin had all the wells outside Jerusalem poisoned to deny them to besiegers.

Things, however, were little better on the other side of the fence: at a conference of Crusader ldrs, Richard assessed the chances of launching a successful assault on Jerusalem as minimal: supply lines too vulnerable/ no water supplies nr the city/ Crusade lacked personnel & resources properly to invest Jerusalem, let alone storm its huge (defended) walls. Broad consensus reached (French disagreed), and, therefore, on 3rd/ 4th July 1192 the Third Crusade started to withdraw to Acre - it was all but over.

* Saladin, however, seems to have got some of his “mojo” back – maybe his health was better, and his “default mode” had always been to react decisively to any opportunities arising.
* Late July, 1192 – Saladin’s forces attacked Jaffa. Vulnerable/ weakly garrisoned – after only 4 days of siege some of its walls were crumbling/ Muslims penetrating outer defences.
* Richard launched an amphibious counter-attack from Acre.
* A v bold move which surprised the nearly victorious Muslims (only Jaffa’s citadel was still holding out), and an assault led personally by Richard resulted in a surprising victory.
* The resulting stalemate (Richard had displayed great skill/ daring/ resolution; Saladin realised that even though he still held Jerusalem, it was not likely he’d be able to force the Crusaders out of S Palestine) led to a negotiated truce.
* Richard, in turn, was exhausted, and v concerned to sort out his problems in Europe caused by bro John & King Philip of France.
* Treaty of Jaffa, 2nd Sept 1192:
* 3 Year truce agreed.
* Muslims retained control of Jerusalem.
* Ascalon’s defences to be demolished – again!
* Crusaders to keep Acre, Jaffa, & strip of coast b/ween them.
* Christian pilgrims allowed access to Church of Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem.
* Essentially, a workable “face-saving” arrangement for Richard & Saladin.
* “Honours even”, altho’ the 2 never actually met.
* Richard did not accompany the groups of Crusaders who did subsequently visit the Holy Sepulchre.
* Had he done so, Saladin wld almost certainly have met him, and prob treated him as a personal guest.
* We don’t know why Richard behaved as he did: possibly he was too ill, but more probably he wld have found it personally humiliating.
* Most likely, however, was the hard political necessity of getting back home asap to confront the personal betrayals of John & Philip.

**What became of Richard & Saladin?**

Saladin:

* Disbanded his forces, Autumn 1192.
* Toured his Palestinian territories, and then wintered in Damascus 1192/3.
* Health failing – died in Damascus, aged 55, 3rd March 1193.
* Buried in a mausoleum in Grand Umayyad Mosque, Damascus.
* 1992, President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria (ruled 1970-2000: eager to project himself as an ‘Islamic champion against Western imperialism’ - a latter day Saladin, even though Assad was an “Alawite” [a Shi’ah sect most Sunni regard as deviant] who was generally v “secular” in his government], commissioned the sculptor, Abdallah al-Sayed, to produce a larger than life, “action figure”, stone statue of Saladin mounted on horseback in full war regalia, flanked by a Muslim warrior & Sufi mystic, enemies (Guy of Lusignan; Reynald of Chatillon) at his feet.
* The statue stands outside the Citadel of Damascus – it is explicitly propagandistic. In Assad’s lifetime, a huge complementary portrait of Assad himself was positioned nearby over the great gates of the Citadel: a v deliberate conflation of the ‘idea of Saladin’ with Assad’s desired public image.
* It’s a remarkable portrayal (esp in a Muslim country, where figurative public artworks of historical figures are quite rare) suggesting the potency of ‘the idea of Saladin’ in popular contemporary Muslim culture.

Richard:

* Richard left Acre, 9th Oct 1192.
* Travelled incognito homewards – he’d made many enemies.
* Luck ran out on the Danube – captured by Duke Leopold of Austria, who bore him a personal grudge over insults inflicted during the 3rd Crusade.
* Only released on payment of a huge ransom (“A King’s ransom”!), Feb 1194.
* April 1194 – Richard re-crowned @ Winchester (to make sure John & his cronies knew he was back, & v much in-charge!), & then spent rest of his reign campaigning to retake his Norman lands from Philip of France.
* Died from a wound infection sustained during a siege in S France, 6th April 1199.
* Buried @ Fontevraud; heart @ Rouen, highlighting his Norman affinity.
* Like Saladin, ‘the idea of Richard’ (“The Lion Heart” etc) has been appropriated by subsequent generations, esp the Victorians – he has become a ‘propaganda icon’ unto whom modern audiences can project their fantasies/ ideals/ prejudices/ preconceptions.
* Like Saladin, an “action figure” statue of Richard was commissioned centuries later, and positioned prominently in a capital city.
* Carlo Marochetti’s statue (orig a temporary plaster cast commissioned for the Great Exhiition, 1851; later recast in bronze, 1860) stands before the Houses of Parliament, Westminster, London.
* Artistically impressive, but ludicrous in some ways – eg Richard’s chain mail armour clings to his muscular torso like Lycra!
* As with the Saladin statue, it is overtly propagandistic, conveying ‘an idea of Richard’ which reflects Victorian ideals of majestic, Christian warrior, kingship.
* For example, the bronze plaques added slightly later to the statue’s plinth show the oft recounted deathbed scene in which Richard allegedly forgave the French crossbow “sniper” who’d shot him.
* Some feel uncomfortable re the location of such a statue in such a prominent public space – was Richard really such an heroic figure? On-going public debate re statues of historical figures whose attitudes/ values/ actions etc wld not be deemed “acceptable” today…?

CRH, 2017.